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Epidemic models trade the modeling accuracy for complexity reduction. This paper proposes to group vertices in directed graphs
based on connectivity and carries out epidemic spread analysis on the group basis, thereby substantially reducing the modeling
complexitywhile preserving themodeling accuracy. A group-based continuous-timeMarkov SISmodel is developed.The adjacency
matrix of the network is also collapsed according to the grouping, to evaluate the Jacobian matrix of the group-based continuous-
time Markov model. By adopting the mean-field approximation on the groups of nodes and links, the model complexity is
significantly reduced as compared with previous topological epidemic models. An epidemic threshold is deduced based on the
spectral radius of the collapsed adjacency matrix. The epidemic threshold is proved to be dependent on network structure and
interdependent of the network scale. Simulation results validate the analytical epidemic threshold and confirm the asymptotical
accuracy of the proposed epidemic model.
1. Introduction
Epidemic models have been widely used to analyze sophis-
ticated interactions in networks, e.g., virus attack and prop-
agation in computer networks [1, 2], rumor spreading in
social networks [3], and cascading failures [4]. As a basic
epidemic model, the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS)
model defines two node states (susceptible and infected) and
captures two state transition processes, namely, the infection
from infected nodes to susceptible nodes and the self-healing
of infected nodes. Earlier epidemic models omit topologies
by assuming a network topology of a complete graph [5].
Network topologies, playing a key role in cyber security [6],
are later considered and proved to have a strong impact on
the epidemic propagation process [7].
Epidemic models trade the modeling accuracy for com-
plexity reduction. Markov-chain based epidemic models are
able to precisely analyze the epidemic propagation process
but require 2𝑁 Markov states to capture the S/I states of𝑁 nodes and therefore can hardly be applied to large-scale
networks [7, 8]. A number of topological epidemic models
[8–12] decompose the 2𝑁-state Markov process into𝑁 small
Markov processes. This is achieved by using the expected
infection probability of every node instead of the actual node
state. A significant result from themodels is that the epidemic
threshold, under which the epidemic will eventually die out,
is given by 1/𝜆1(A), where 𝜆1(A) is the largest eigenvalue of
the adjacency matrix of the network topology [9].
Network features, e.g., the degree distribution of scale-
free networks [13], can be employed to simplify epidemic
models by adopting the degree-based mean-field approach
[14]. Specifically, nodes with the same degree are assumed
to be infected with the same probabilities. An interesting
result of the epidemic in scale-free networks is the absence
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of an epidemic threshold [15]. The degree-based mean-field
approach has extended the SIS process, e.g., the epidemic
propagation with incubation and the epidemic with a recov-
ery state [16, 17]. However, the degree-based epidemic model
cannot capture epidemic propagations in specific networks.
This paper presents a group-based continuous-time
Markov model to quantitatively analyze the SIS process in
large-scale directed networks. We start with the network
modeling, where nodes are categorized into groups accord-
ing to their connectivity. A collapsed adjacency matrix is
proposed to describe the network topology. Based on the
node groups, a continuous-time Markov model is proposed
to capture the SIS-type propagation, where the state of a
group is estimated by taking the mean-field approximation.
Focusing on the problemof epidemic threshold, the proposed
nonlinear model is linearized via omitting high-order terms
around the disease-free point. The epidemic threshold is
derived by performingmatrix analysis on the Jacobianmatrix
of the linearized model and then validated by simulations.
The key contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
(i) We propose a new modeling method, which groups
nodes with the same connectivity in directed net-
works and models the epidemic propagation of the
groups by using continuous-timeMarkov SISmodels.
(ii) By taking the mean-field approximation, the pro-
posed SIS model is asymptotically accurate with
the decrease of effective spreading rate and/or the
increase of node groups.
(iii) Linearization and stability analysis are carried out
on the proposed SIS model to deduce the epidemic
threshold, under which the epidemic eventually
becomes extinct.
(iv) The epidemic threshold is proved to be dependent on
network structure and interdependent of the network
scale.
Comprehensive simulations confirm the validity of the
proposed mean-field epidemic model and the deduced epi-
demic threshold in large-scale networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
related works are reviewed. In Section 3, the directed network
model is presented, followed by the proposed mean-field SIS
model in Section 4. In Section 5, numerical and simulation
results are provided, followed by conclusions in Section 6.
2. Related Work
The SIS model was firstly developed for biological infectious
diseases, which defines two states for a node, i.e., susceptible
or infected [5]. A susceptible node can be infected with
probability 𝛽 by an infected neighbor. An infected node
can be cured with probability 𝛾. Recently, various states
were introduced into the SIS model. Kephart et al. [18] and
Vojnovic et al. [19] proposed a new “warning” state at every
node, in addition to the “infected” and “susceptible” states.
The probability of a node switching to the “warning” state
depends on the population of nodes in the warning state
and is independent of the network topology. The SIS model
was extended with “quarantined”, “vaccinated”, and “delay”
states, to capture the time-delayedwormpropagation in com-
puter networks [20]. These models significantly simplified
the dynamic process by omitting the impact of network
topologies.
The network topologies can have a strong impact on
epidemic propagations [11]. In [8], the continuous-time
Markov processwas adopted tomodel epidemic propagations
in specific topologies, where every Markov state collects
the states of all nodes in the network. The second largest
eigenvalue of the Markov transition matrix determines the
convergence rate to the absorbing virus-free state. With
a discrete-time Markov model, the convergence rate was
proved to be asymptotically bounded [7].TheMarkovmodels
can be decomposed into 𝑁 small Markov processes in 𝑁-
node networks by applying the mean-field theory to achieve
tractability [8, 10–12]. The decomposed 𝑁 Markov processes
deduced a widely approved result that a virus dies out quickly
if 𝛽/𝛾 < 1/𝜆1(A), where A is the adjacency matrix of
the network, and 𝜆1(A) is the largest eigenvalue of A. The
network can also be dynamic, where nodes can transfer
among communities [21].The simulation results on two com-
munities revealed that the node mobility can accelerate the
malware propagation and improve the epidemic threshold.
Some network features can be employed to simplify
epidemic models and improve tractability. Pastor-Satorras et
al. [15] derived the probability of a node being infected as a
function of the expected number of its infected neighbors
in scale-free networks. The number of infected nodes at
the equilibrium state was given by 𝜌 ≈ 2𝑒−1/𝑚𝜏, where𝑚 is a network generation parameter and 𝜏 is the effective
spreading rate. Zou et al. [22] simulated the propagation of
Internet email worms in scale-free graphs and showed that
the aforementioned result can be overestimated due to the
implicit homogeneous mixing assumption. Meanwhile, Li et
al. showed the analysis on scale-free graphs is inaccurate for
specific topologies [23].
The statistic topology models are generally based on
undirected networks. However, there is an intrinsic direc-
tionality in the propagation in specific types of dynam-
ics, e.g., infectious disease spreading [24] and information
transmission [25]. Directed networks, sets of vertices, and
a collection of directed edges that connect pairs of ordered
vertices are useful to represent specific transmissions with
intrinsic directionality in the propagation [14]. Meyers et
al. [26] employed the percolation theory to predict disease
transmission through semidirected contact networks, where
edges may be directed or undirected and found that the
probability of an epidemic and the expected fraction of a
population infected during an epidemic can be different in
semidirected networks, in contrast to the routine assumption
that these two quantities are equal. Li et al. [27] defined
the directionality 𝜉 as the percentage of unidirectional links
and found that the lower bound of the epidemic threshold
increases with a growing 𝜉, implying that the directionality
hinders the propagation of epidemic processes. In [28],
Khanafer et al. studied the stability of an SIS N-intertwined
Markov model over arbitrary directed network topologies
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Figure 1: An example of networks we considered where 7 nodes are
categorized into three groups according to the connection between
them.
and showed that when the basic reproduction number is
greater than one, the epidemic state is locally exponentially
stable, and when the network is not initialized at the disease-
free state, the epidemic state is globally asymptotically stable.
3. The Directed Network Model
We consider the SIS epidemic process in a strongly connected
network with 𝑁 nodes connected by directed edges. Each
node in the network can be in either a susceptible (𝑆) or an
infected (𝐼) state. An infected node can infect its susceptible
neighbors along the directed edges at the rate of 𝛽 per edge.
Infected nodes can independently recover to be susceptible at
the rate of 𝛾.
We suppose that the 𝑁 nodes in a network G can be
categorized into 𝑛 groups, denoted by 𝐺1, 𝐺2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝐺𝑛, where
the nodes in the same group have the same out-degrees
and the same number of edges to the nodes in the same
destination group. The number of 𝐺𝑖-nodes can be denoted
by 𝑁𝑖 (here, ∑𝑖𝑁𝑖 = 𝑁). Given the node groups, we define
a collapsed adjacency matrix, denoted by A, to describe the
topology of G. The (𝑖, 𝑗)-th entry of the matrix, denoted by𝑎𝑖𝑗, describes the number of edges from a 𝐺𝑖-node pointing
to 𝐺𝑗-nodes. As a result, G can be described by the node
number vector N = [𝑁1, 𝑁2, . . . , 𝑁𝑛] and the collapsed
adjacency matrix A. Figure 1 provides an example of node
categorization, where𝑁 = 7 nodes are categorized into 𝑛 = 3















Other notations are defined as follows: [𝐴]𝑖 (𝐴 ∈ {𝑆, 𝐼})
denotes the number of 𝐺𝑖-nodes in state 𝐴. 𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑗 denotes
an edge starting from a 𝐺𝑖-node and ending at a 𝐺𝑗-node,
where the 𝐺𝑖-node and the 𝐺𝑗-node are in states 𝐴 and𝐵, respectively. [𝐴𝐵]𝑖𝑗 denotes the number of 𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑗 edges.
Let [𝐴𝐵𝐶]𝑖𝑗𝑘 ([𝐴𝐵𝐶]󸀠𝑖𝑗𝑘) denote the number of edge pairs







Figure 2: An example of [𝐴𝐵𝐶]𝑖𝑗𝑘 and [𝐴𝐵𝐶]󸀠𝑖𝑗𝑘.
by Figure 2. Numerical relationships between states of nodes
and states of edges satisfy
𝑁𝑖 = [𝑆]𝑖 + [𝐼]𝑖 ; (2a)
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖 = [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗 + [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗 ; (2b)
𝑎𝑖𝑗 [𝑆]𝑖 = [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗 + [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗 ; (2c)
𝑎𝑖𝑗 [𝐼]𝑖 = [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗 ; (2d)
[𝑆]𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖 − [𝐼]𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖 − 1𝑎𝑖𝑗 ([𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗) . (2e)
Here, (2a) is because any node is in either an 𝑆or 𝐼 state. (2b) is
because any edge is in one of the four states given in the right-
hand side (RHS) of (2b). Meanwhile, edges can be classified
according to the state of the starting point, as given by (2c)
and (2d). (2e) is deduced from (2a), (2b), and (2d).
4. Group-Based Mean-Field SIS Model
We propose to analyze the SIS process in directed networks
by employing the mean-field approximation which uses a
single average effect to approximate the effect of all the other
individuals on any given individual. Thus, the same group
of nodes in our model are evaluated by the same average
estimation.The state transitions of nodes and edges in the SIS
process can be given by
d [𝑆]𝑖
d𝑡 = 𝛾 [𝐼]𝑖 − ∑
𝑗
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑖 ; (3a)
d [𝐼]𝑖
d𝑡 = −𝛾 [𝐼]𝑖 + ∑
𝑗
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑖 ; (3b)
d [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗
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Here, (3a) and (3b) give the changing rate of susceptible
and infected 𝐺𝑖-nodes. The RHS is because an infected 𝐺𝑖-
node can be cured with the rate 𝛾; a susceptible 𝐺𝑖-node
can be infected with the rate 𝛽 per edge by an infected 𝐺𝑗
neighbor. In the continuous-time model, the time slot is
infinitesimal that the infection rate can be summed together,
i.e., ∑𝑗 𝛽[𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑖.
Equations (3c)-(3f) capture the time-varying number of
links. The first two terms on the RHS of (3c) are because
an 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗 edge can transfer from an 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗 or 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑗 edge when the
infected node is cured. The last two terms on the RHS of (3c)
capture the cases where the starting 𝐺𝑖-node or the ending𝐺𝑗-node is infected by its infected neighbors. (3d) is because
an 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗 edge can transfer to an 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗 edge in the case that the
infected 𝐺𝑗-node is cured at the rate 𝛾; and to 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑗 in the
case that the susceptible 𝐺𝑖-node is infected by its infected
neighbors. 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗 can transfer from 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑗 in the case that the
infected 𝐺𝑖-node is cured with the rate 𝛾 or from 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑗 in the
case that the susceptible 𝐺𝑗-node is infected by its infected
neighbors. Different from previous SIS models in undirected
networks, e.g., [15], 𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗 cannot transfer to 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑗, as the epidemic
can only propagate along directed edges. Equation (3e) can
be similarly obtained attaching the infection process, i.e.,−𝛽[𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗. Equation (3f) is self-explanatory.
Known as the disease-free equilibrium point, the equi-
librium point of interest is ([𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗, [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗, [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗) = (0, 0, 0);
i.e., all nodes are susceptible. The condition of the disease-
free equilibrium point can be deduced by linearizing the
SIS model given by (3a)–(3f). This is because the stability
of the original nonlinear system can be determined by the
eigenvalues of the linearized model as stated in Lyapunov’s
First Method [29].
To linearize the SIS model, the number of edge pairs[𝐴𝐵𝐶]𝑖𝑗𝑘 and [𝐴𝐵𝐶]󸀠𝑖𝑗𝑘 is first estimated by using the number
of unpaired edges. This is achieved by applying the moment
closure approximation as evaluated in [30, 31]. As a result, we
have
[𝐼𝑆𝑆]𝑘𝑖𝑗 = [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗[𝑆]𝑖 =
[𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑖 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑝 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑝) /𝑎𝑖𝑝 ; (4a)
[𝑆𝑆𝐼]󸀠𝑖𝑗𝑘 = [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗 [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗[𝑆]𝑗 =
[𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗 [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑗 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑞 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑗𝑞) /𝑎𝑗𝑞 ; (4b)
[𝐼𝑆𝐼]𝑘𝑖𝑗 = [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗[𝑆]𝑖 =
[𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑖 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑝 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑝) /𝑎𝑖𝑝 ; (4c)
[𝐼𝑆𝐼]󸀠𝑖𝑗𝑘 = [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗[𝑆]𝑗 =
[𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗
𝑁𝑗 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑞 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑗𝑞) /𝑎𝑗𝑞 . (4d)
In (4a), every susceptible 𝐺𝑖-node on average has [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗/[𝑆]𝑖
edges pointing to𝐺𝑗-nodes. [𝑆]𝑖 is then estimated by employ-
ing (2e), where 𝑝 and 𝑞 are introduced to solve the equation.
Here, 𝑝 satisfies [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑝 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑝 > 0 and 𝑎𝑖𝑝 > 0; 𝑞 satisfies[𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑞 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑗𝑞 > 0 and 𝑎𝑗𝑞 > 0. (4b)-(4d) can be similarly
obtained.
By substituting (4a)–(4d) into (3a)–(3f), (3c)-(3f) can be
rewritten as
d [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗
d𝑡 = 𝛾 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗
− ∑
𝑘






d𝑡 = −𝛾 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗
+ ∑
𝑘
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗 [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑗 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑞 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑗𝑞) /𝑎𝑗𝑞
− ∑
𝑘
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑝 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑝) /𝑎𝑖𝑝 ;
(5b)
d [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗
d𝑡 = −𝛾 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗 − 𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗
+ ∑
𝑘
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑝 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑝) /𝑎𝑖𝑝
− ∑
𝑘
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗𝑁𝑗 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑞 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑗𝑞) /𝑎𝑗𝑞 ;
(5c)
d [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗
d𝑡 = −2𝛾 [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗
+ ∑
𝑘
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑝 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑝) /𝑎𝑖𝑝
+ ∑
𝑘
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗𝑁𝑗 − ([𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑞 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑗𝑞) /𝑎𝑗𝑞 .
(5d)
The terms of [𝑆𝑆]𝑖𝑗 can be suppressed by substituting (2b) into
(5a)–(5d). As a result, we have
d [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗
d𝑡
= −𝛾 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗
+ ∑
𝑘
𝛽[𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗 (𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖 − [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗 − [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 − [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗)𝑁𝑗 − (1/𝑎𝑗𝑞) ([𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑞 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑗𝑞)
− ∑
𝑘
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖 − (1/𝑎𝑖𝑝) ([𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑝 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑝) ;
(6a)
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d [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗
d𝑡
= −𝛾 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗 − 𝛽𝑖𝑗 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗
+ ∑
𝑘
𝛽[𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 (𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖 − [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗 − [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 − [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗)𝑁𝑖 − (1/𝑎𝑖𝑝) ([𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑝 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑝)
− ∑
𝑘




= −2𝛾 [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗
+ ∑
𝑘
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖 − (1/𝑎𝑖𝑝) ([𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑝 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑝)
+ ∑
𝑘
𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗𝑁𝑗 − (1/𝑎𝑗𝑞) ([𝐼𝑆]𝑗𝑞 + [𝐼𝐼]𝑗𝑞) .
(6c)
Near the disease-free equilibrium point, (6a)–(6c) can be
linearized by suppressing all higher order terms. As a result,
we have
d [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗
d𝑡 ≈ −𝛾 [𝑆𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + ∑
𝑘
𝛽𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑖 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑗𝑁𝑗 ; (7a)
d [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗
d𝑡 ≈ − (𝛾 + 𝛽) [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + ∑
𝑘
𝛽𝑎𝑖𝑗 [𝐼𝑆]𝑘𝑖 ; (7b)
d [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗
d𝑡 ≈ −2𝛾 [𝐼𝐼]𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽 [𝐼𝑆]𝑖𝑗 . (7c)
After the model has been linearized, the condition of the
disease-free equilibriumpoint can be obtained by performing
eigenvalue analysis on the Jacobian matrix of the lineariza-
tion.The Jacobianmatrix is a 3𝑛2×3𝑛2matrix and denoted by
J. The nonlinear dynamic system is stable at the equilibrium
point if and only if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
are negative, as stated by the Hartman-Grobman Theorem
[32]. In other words, the epidemic is certainly extinct if
𝜆1 (J) < 0, (8)
where 𝜆1(⋅) is the largest eigenvalue of the operator. J is the








= [ J11 J12 J130 J∗ ] , (9)
where J11 is an 𝑛2×𝑛2 diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries
are −𝛾. We note that J21 and J31 are zero matrices. As a result,
J is an upper block triangular matrix, and
𝜆 (J) = 𝜆 (J11) ∪ 𝜆 (J∗) , (10)
where 𝜆(⋅) is the set of eigenvalues of the operator.
Here, J23, J32, and J33 are 𝑛2 × 𝑛2 diagonal matrices. Their
diagonal entries are 𝛾, 𝛽, and −2𝛾, respectively. The entry in
the (𝑛(𝑖−1)+𝑗)-th row, (𝑛(𝑘−1)+𝑙)-th column of J22, denoted
by 𝐽22𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑙, is given by
𝐽22𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑙 =
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝛽 − (𝛾 + 𝛽) , if 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑘𝑙, 𝑖 = 𝑙
− (𝛾 + 𝛽) , if 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑘𝑙, 𝑖 ̸= 𝑙
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝛽, if 𝑖𝑗 ̸= 𝑘𝑙, 𝑖 = 𝑙
0, if 𝑖𝑗 ̸= 𝑘𝑙, 𝑖 ̸= 𝑙.
(11)










we have 𝜆(J∗) = 𝜆(J33) ∪ 𝜆(H), where H = J22 − J23J33−1J32.
The entry in the (𝑛(𝑖 − 1) + 𝑗)-th row, (𝑛(𝑘 − 1) + 𝑙)-th column
ofH, denoted by𝐻𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑙, is given by
𝐻𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑙 =
{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝛽 − (𝛾 + 𝛽2) , if 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑘𝑙, 𝑖 = 𝑙
− (𝛾 + 𝛽2) , if 𝑖𝑗 = 𝑘𝑙, 𝑖 ̸= 𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑗𝛽, if 𝑖𝑗 ̸= 𝑘𝑙, 𝑖 = 𝑙
0, if 𝑖𝑗 ̸= 𝑘𝑙, 𝑖 ̸= 𝑙.
(13)
We conclude that 𝜆(J) = 𝜆(J11) ∪ 𝜆(J33) ∪ 𝜆(H). Note that
J11 and J33 are diagonal matrices, and all the diagonal entries
of them are negative, i.e., all the eigenvalues of J11 and J33 are
negative. As a result, we have
𝜆1 (J) < 0 ⇐⇒ 𝜆1 (H) < 0. (14)
The matrixH can be written as
H = P +Q, (15)
where Q is a diagonal matrix and can be given by Q =
diag[−(𝛾 + 𝛽/2)]. The entry in the (𝑛(𝑖 − 1) + 𝑗)-th row,(𝑛(𝑘 − 1) + 𝑙)-th column of P, denoted by 𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑙, is given by
𝑃𝑖𝑗,𝑘𝑙 = {{{
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝛽, if 𝑖 = 𝑙
0, otherwise. (16)
We have that all the eigenvalues ofQ are −(𝛾 + 𝛽/2) and
𝜆 (H) = 𝜆 (P) − (𝛾 + 𝛽2) . (17)
Note that P is a 𝑛2 × 𝑛2 sparse matrix and similar with a
block matrix consisting of 𝛽A and zero matrices as given by
P = X−1 [ 𝛽A 00 0 ]X. (18)
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This is achieved by performing matrix operations on P. Thus,
the eigenvalues of P can be given by
𝜆 (P) = 𝛽 × 𝜆 (A) ∪ 0. (19)
Combining (8), (14), (17), and (19), the epidemic will
become extinct if 𝛽𝜆1(A) − (𝛾 + 𝛽/2) < 0. In other words,
the epidemic threshold, denoted by 𝜏∗, is given by
𝜏∗ = 1𝜆1 (A) − 1/2 . (20)
The epidemic dies out, if 𝜏 = 𝛽/𝛾 < 𝜏∗.
5. Simulation and Numerical Results
In this section, numerical and simulation results are pre-
sented to validate the proposed group-based SIS model
and the deduced epidemic threshold. In every run of the
simulations, the groups and the network topology, i.e., the
scale and structure, are first set up, according to the rules
specified in Section 3; i.e., 𝑎𝑖𝑗 number of directed edges are
added from a 𝐺𝑖-node to 𝑎𝑖𝑗 number of randomly selected𝐺𝑗-nodes. The nodes do not connect themselves despite𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0. Then, the infection rate 𝛽 and the curing rate 𝛾 are
configured, based on the analytical epidemic threshold 𝜏∗.
The simulations are carried out on theNepidemiX [33], which
is a Python library implementing simulations of epidemics.
For initialization, randomly selected 10% of the nodes are
infected. During a simulation run, the infected nodes can
be cured at the rate of 𝛾. Every infected node can infect its
neighbors connected by edges at the rate of 𝛽. Every dot
in the figures is the average of 100 independent runs under
the same configurations, including the network topology, the
percentage of initially infected nodes, 𝛽 and 𝛾.
We first validate our model on a 1000-node network
where nodes connect each other and form a complete graph.
The infection and curing rates are set to be 𝛽 = 0.0005 and𝛾 = 0.1 per time slot. 𝜏 = 𝛽/𝛾 = 0.005 is set to be larger than𝜏∗ = 0.001 to evaluate the proposed model. Ten percent of
nodes are randomly chosen to be infected at 𝑡 = 0. Figure 3
plots the infection density, given by∑[𝐼]𝑖/𝑁, from 𝑡 = 0 to 30.
The analytical results are numerically evaluated by employing
(6a)–(6c) with the nodes evenly divided into 1, 2, 5, 10, 25, and
50 groups, respectively.
From Figure 3, we can see that the analytical results
can asymptotically approach the simulation results with the
increasing number of groups, e.g., from 𝑛 = 1 to 𝑛 = 50. The
simulation results can outgrow the analytical results when
the number of node groups is small. The analytical results
under a single group of nodes, i.e., 𝑛 = 1, can substantially
underestimate the infection density. The analytical result is
only 83.8% (0.67/0.8) of the simulation result, when 𝑡 = 30. In
contrast, the analytical results under 50 groups of nodes, i.e.,
when 𝑛 = 50, match the simulation results indistinguishably.
This is because the proposed model is designed to decouple
the state transitions of edges connecting nodes from different
groups and estimate the number of edges connecting infected
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Figure 3: The growth of infection density where a complete graph
with 1000 nodes is considered. 𝛽 = 0.0005 and 𝛾 = 0.1. The
analytical results are obtained based on (6a)–(6c) by evenly dividing
the nodes into 1, 2, 5, 10, 25, and 50 groups.
mean-field approximation is applied to model the interplay
between the averaged ratios of infectious edges connecting
different pairs of node groups. With an increasing number of
node groups, the averaged ratio of infectious edges connect-
ing a specific pair of node groups can become increasingly
representative with a reducing deviation. In other words, the
averaged ratio becomes increasingly precise for a reducing set
of edges. In the special case where every node forms a group
(i.e., the number of groups is 𝑛 = 1000), the ratio is exactly
the probability at which an edge is infectious. The proposed
model is able to capture the state transition of an edge under
the averaged effect of all other individual edges, and can be
fairly accurate given the large number of edges. Note that the
number of groups, e.g., 𝑛 = 50, is far less than the network
size, i.e., 1000. This finding allows us to model the epidemic
propagation with a small number of differential equations.
Figure 3 also shows that the analytical results can be accurate
at the initial stage (or low infection densities) even with few
node groups. This is because the state transitions of different
edges are loosely coupled if only very few nodes are infected.
We proceed to evaluate the model accuracy with different
infection densities. This is done by adjusting the infection
rate. A 1000-node network is considered where nodes con-
nect each other and form a complete graph. The epidemic
propagationwith four effective spreading rates, i.e., 𝜏 = 𝛽/𝛾 =0.002, 0.0015, 0.0011, and 0.001, are simulated and analyzed.
The values of 𝜏 are larger than, and close to, the analytical
threshold. The infection rates are obtained by adjusting 𝛽
while setting 𝛾 to 0.1. The analysis is based on (6a)–(6c)
by evenly dividing the nodes into 5 groups to explore the
applicability of the model to a small number of groups.



























Figure 4: The infection density with the growth of time where
a complete graph with 1000 nodes is considered. The analytical
results are obtained based on (6a)–(6c) by evenly dividing the nodes
into 5 groups where 𝜏 = 𝛽/𝛾 = 0.002, 0.0015, 0.0011, and 0.001,
respectively.
From Figure 4, we can see that the simulation results still
overtake the analytical results when 𝜏 = 0.0015 and 0.002.
For example, the simulation result is 0.459 in the case of𝑡 = 40 and 𝜏 = 0.002, while the analytical result is only 0.418.
However, the gap between simulation results and analytical
results decreases with dropping 𝜏, i.e., from 𝜏 = 0.002 to
0.0015.When 𝜏 further declines, i.e., 𝜏 = 0.0011 and 0.001, the
analytical results are able tomatch the simulation results from
the beginning to the end. According to (20), the epidemic
threshold is given by 𝜏∗ = 0.001. This figure reveals that the
proposed mean-field model is asymptotically accurate with
a decreasing 𝜏 and is able to precisely describe the epidemic
propagation when the effective spreading rate is around the
epidemic threshold.
We evaluate the epidemic threshold 𝜏∗ given by (20) in
Figure 5. Three networks with 500 nodes are considered,
where nodes are divided into three groups (i.e., N =[100, 200, 200]). The impact of the network topology on the
threshold is evaluated by varying the number of edges in the
network.Without loss of generality, their collapsed adjacency









where 𝛼 = 4, 6, or 8. The curing rate 𝛾 is set to be 0.1. Ten
percent of nodes are randomly selected to be infected at the
initial state. The infection density at 𝑡 = 1000 is used as the
stable infection density, as indicated by the 𝑦-axis. Evaluated
with (20), the epidemic threshold is 𝜏∗= 0.005, 0.0033, and


























Figure 5:The validation of epidemic threshold given by (20), where
the 𝑦-axis is the infection density at 𝑡 = 1000. Three networks with
500 nodes are considered. 𝛾 is set to be 0.1. 𝛼 = 4, 6, 8 is used to
adjust the number of edges.
Figure 5 that 𝜏∗ (the solid vertical lines) can precisely specify
the epidemic thresholds. When 𝜏 < 𝜏∗, the epidemic can be
suppressed eventually. When 𝜏 > 𝜏∗, the infection density
grows with 𝜏 and also exhibits convexity. We can see that
the network topology has a strong impact on the epidemic
threshold and the infection density. Specifically, the threshold
decreases with the growth of 𝛼. For example, 𝜏 halves from0.005 to 0.0025, when 𝛼 doubles from 4 to 8 (the number of
edges doubles, as well). The infection density increases with
the growth of𝛼, especially around the threshold. For example,
in the case of 𝛼 = 8 and 𝜏 = 0.005, the infection density is 0.5
as compared to the infection density of 𝛼 = 4.
We note that the epidemic threshold, given by (20), is
determined by the network structure A, rather than the
number of nodes given by N. To illustrate this, we compare
the number of infected populations in different scales of
networks, illustrated by Figure 6. To be specific, N = 𝛿 ×[10, 20, 20], where 𝛿 = 2, 4 and 6, respectively. Their
collapsed adjacencymatrices are obtained with (21) by letting𝛼 = 1. As a result, 𝜏∗ = 0.02. Figure 6 firstly confirms
the accuracy of 𝜏∗ illustrated by the solid vertical line. The
observation that the three networks with the same structure
but different scales share the same epidemic threshold val-
idates that the epidemic threshold depends on the network
structure rather than the scale. This finding can significantly
reduce the complexity to deduce the epidemic threshold,
i.e., from decomposing an 𝑁-dimensional matrix by using1/𝜆1(A), given by [12], to decomposing an 𝑛 dimensional
matrix (𝑛 ≪ 𝑁). For example, 𝑁 = 1000 and 𝑛 = 5
in Figure 4, and 𝑁 = 500 and 𝑛 = 3 in Figure 5. It is
interesting to notice that the infection densities are the same,
e.g., 79.6/100 ≈ 158.8/200 ≈ 240/300 in the case of 𝜏 = 0.1,
















Figure 6: The validation of epidemic threshold, where the 𝑦-axis
is the infected population at 𝑡 = 1000. Different scales of networks
(𝑁=100, 200, and 300, respectively) are considered. 𝛾 is set to be 0.1.
although the infected population varies in different scales
of networks. This can be the reason of that the epidemic
threshold depends on the network structure rather than the
network scale.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we designed a continuous-time SIS model in
large-scale networks. By categorizing nodes into groups, the
model complexity was significantly reduced. The proposed
epidemic model was validated to be asymptotically accurate
with the decrease of the effective spreading rate and/or
the increase of node groups. The epidemic threshold can
be deduced with the largest eigenvalue of the collapsed
adjacency matrix whose dimension is much smaller than the
network scale. Simulation results corroborated the effective-
ness of the model, as well as the analytical accuracy of the
threshold in large-scale networks.
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